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NOTES
THE LIABILITY INSURER AS A REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE MINNESOTA RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Committee on Court Rules of the Minnesota State Bar
Association has recommended, despite a dissenting minority report,1
two highly controversial amendments to the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure 2 which are based on the concept of the liability
insurer as a real party in interest 3 in negligence litigation. The
Committee has suggested that the Rules be amended so that: (1)
any party may join as a party defendant "an insurance company
which has a financial interest adverse to him in any action arising
out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle" 4 and (2) that
"the claimant in a negligence action [be given] an absolute right
to discover the insurance coverage and policy limits" of his adver-
sary.5
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate these two proposed
amendments in light of present law applicable to the liability insurer
and with a view toward determining what should be the status of
the liability insurance company in negligence litigation.
TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE LIABILITY INSURER
At common law the right of an injured party to recover against
the tortfeasor's liability insurer was extremely limited. Such a right
existed only if the policy was construed as insuring the tortfeasor
against liability for injuries to third persons. However, the ordinary
liability insurance contract was generally construed merely to in-
1. 13 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 10, p. 61 (1956).
2. The rules, which are substantially equivalent to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, were promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court on June
25, 1951, pursuant to authority granted by the Minnesota Legislature to
regulate practice, pleading and procedure for civil actions in all courts except
those of probate. Minn. Stat. § 480.051(Supp. 1956). The rules are set out in
full with extensive commentaries by the authors in Wright, Minnesota Rules
(1954) ; Youngquist and Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice (1953). For a
comprehensive discussion of their practical application see Symposium, 36
Minn. L. Rev. 565 (1952).
3. "Real party in interest" as it is used in this note is not to be confused
with the term as it is used in Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.01, which provides that every
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest and thus
applies only to the plaintiff. Herein the term will be used to denote all parties
who are "actually and substantially interested in the subject matter" of the
litigation. See Caughey v. George Jensen & Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 134-35, 258
P.2d 357, 359 (1953) ; Froling v. Farrar, 77 N.D. 639, 642-43, 44 N.W.2d 763,
765 (1950).
4. 13 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 6, p. 42 (1956).
5. Ibid.
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demnify the insured against his actual pecuniary loss.0 In this type
of policy, the injured party secured no rights against the tortfeasor's
insurer since no privity of contract existed between the injured per-
son and the insurer. The insurer did not become indebted to the
insured until a judgment was secured against, and paid by, the
insured. Thus, if the insured was bankrupt or insolvent, the insurer
was relieved of liability under the policy.7 In response to the inequi-
table results of this construction,8 most states enacted statutes which,
broadly speaking, prevent the insurer from conditioning his liability
on the insured's ability to pay the judgment.9 These statutes, by
giving the injured person access to the tortfeasor's insurance funds,
have transformed the technical indemnity-type policy into a form of
liability insurance contract.'"
To perpetuate the indemnity theory and thus protect the insurer
from direct liability to third persons, most liability insurance con-
tracts specifically provide that no action may be brought on the
policy until a judgment has been secured against the insured and
returned unsatisfied." Although the solvency of the insured is no
longer a condition precedent to the insurer's liability,'2 the con-
cept of the insurer as an indemnitor has been retained by judicial
acceptance on this "no-action" clause. Thus, in order to recover
against the insurer, the injured person must initially bring an
action on the merits against the tortfeasor. He may then have to
institute proceedings against the insurer to enforce the judgment
against the insured. Absent statute 3 or contractual agreement other-
6. A technical distinction is made between a "liability" policy and an
"indemnity" policy. The former gives rise to a right in the injured person
against the insurer as soon as the injury occurs, while the latter indemnifies
the insured after he has satisfied the claim. See, e.g., Anoka Lumber Co. v.
Fidelity & Gas. Co., 63 Minn. 286, 292-93, 65 N.W. 353, 355 (1895) ; Vance.
Insurance § 135 (3d ed. 1951). Cases recognizing this distinction are collected
in Annot., 117 A.L.R. 239 (1938) ; 83 A.L.R. 677 (1933) ; 37 A.L.R. 644(1905).
7. See Vance, op. cit. mupra, note 6 at 801.
8. Id. at 802. See Legis. Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 236 n.42 (1938).
9. See e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 11580 (Deering 1950): Minn. Stat. § 60.51
(1953) ; Vance, op. cit. supra, note 6 at 804 & § nn. 22-24.
10. See Vance, op cit. supra, note 6 at 804.
11. Id. at 800.
12. The National Standard Automobile Liability Policy specifically so
provides. See Patterson, Cases and Materials on the Law of Insurance 784(3d ed. 1955) ; Vance, op. city mpra, note 6 at 804-05.
13. Three states have enacted direct action statutes. A Louisiana statute
permits the injured party to sue the insurer directly, without the requirement
that judgment must first be secured against the insured tortfeasor. La. Rev.
Stat. § 22.655 (1950). A Wisconsin statute permits the injured party to ioin
the insurer in the original action in automobile accident litigation. Wis. Stat.§§ 85.93, 260.11 (1955). A Rhode Island statute permits direct action against
the insurer when the insured tortfeasor cannot be served within the state.
RI. Gen. Laws § 155.1 (1938).
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wise, the insurer may not be joined as a party in the original suit
against the insured tortfeasor.1 4
Traditionally the liability insurer has not been considered to be
a real party in interest to the litigation even though it may assume
complete control of the defense of the action brought against the
insured. That the defendant is insured is considered irrelevant to
the substantive issues, 1" and the fact that an insurer is involved in
the litigation is concealed from the jury, even though ordinarily the
identity of parties involved in litigation, and their interests to litiga-
tion are disclosed to the court and the jury.
JOINDER OF TIlE INSURER UNDER THE RULES
Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," and their
counterparts in the states," has raised the question whether the lib-
eral provisions for joinder of parties and claims' s would permit
consolidation of the action against the tortfeasor with the action to
recover on the policy against the tortfeasor's insurer. Such a result
has been achieved where under Rule 1410 the defendant has been
permitted to implead his liability insurer. In these cases, it is reasoned
that since the insurer "is or may be liable" to the insured tortfeasor
for any judgment secured by the injured party, the defendant may
bring in his liability insurer as a third party defendant in the original
action, in order to have all rights and liabilities determined in one
lawsuit.
°
It might be argued that, applied literally, Rule 2021 would permit
the injured person similarly to consolidate the two actions. The
Rule provides for permissive joinder, as defendants, of all parties
14. E.g., Charlton v. Van Etten, 55 F.2d 418 (D. Minn. 1932) ; Smith
Stage Co. v. Eckert, 21 Ariz. 28, 184 P. 1001 (1919) ; see Anderson v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836
(1946), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 492 (1947) ; Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and
Insurer as Parties Delendant, 22 Marq. L. Rev. 75-78 (1938) ; but see Peter-
son v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 440, 232 N.W. 790, 791 (1930).
15. See McCormick, Evidence 168 (1954) ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 282a (3d ed. 1940).
16. These rules are set out in full with commentaries in Moore, Federal
Practice (2d ed. 1948).
17. For a survey of the extent to which the states have adopted pro-
cedural reforms, see Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administra-
tion 93-136 (1949).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18-24; Minn. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18-24. For a
discussion of the practical effect of these rules, see Wright, Joinder of Claims
and Parties Under Moder, Reading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580 (1952).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) : Minn. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
20. See, e.g., Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140 (W.D.Mo. 1945): Pio-
neer Mut. Compensation Co. v. Cosby, 125 Colo. 468, 244 P.2d 1089 (1952);
DeParcq and Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under Modern Plead-
ing Rules, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 229 (1954). But see, Auliso v. California Oil Co..
120 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) ; Minn. R. Civ. P. 20.01.
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against whom there is asserted some right to relief which arises out
of the same transaction or occurence "if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action."22 Thus, in a personal
injury action, the injured person might assert a right to relief -
against both the tortfeasor and his insurer - which arose out of the
same occurence, namely the accident which caused the injury. The
tort liability of the insured, and the insurer's liability under the
policy, will certainly present questions of fact and lav common to
all the parties.2 3 Also, it might be asserted that Rule 18, which pro-
vides for joinder of claims,2 4 permits the injured person to join his
claim against the torifeasor with his claim against the tortfeasor's
insurer. This Rule states that "whenever a claim is one heretofore
cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a con-
clusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action... ."22 The
claim of an injured person against the tortfeasor's insurer, even
though contingent upon securing a judgment against the insured,
would certainly appear to be "cognizable" after his claim against
the insured was -determined.
However, adherence to the indemnity theory by construction of
the "no action" clause, has thus far precluded joinder by the injured
party under these Rules.2 6 These decisions are apparently based on
the rationale that the injured party secures no claim against the
insurer which he may join, or no right to relief which he may assert,
until after final determination of the insured's tort liability.2 Courts
stress the contention that, absent legislation, the course of action
which the injured party must follow is to be controlled solely by the
policy terms.
THE PROPOSED AmENDMENT
The amendment which the Court Rules Committee has recom-
mended provides for permissive joinder of the defendant's liability
insurer in cases which arise out of the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle.2 s The language of the proposed amendment would
22. Ibid.
23. But see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lattavo Bros., Inc. 9 F.R.D. 205,
206 (N.D.Ohio 1949).
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(b) ; Minn. R. Civ. P. 18.02.
25. Ibid.
26. See Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (D.Mich. 1940); Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. Lattavo Bros., Inc., 9 F.R.D. 205 (W.D.Ohio 1949) ; Jennings
v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D.Mass. 1940) ; Crowley v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo.
489, 223 P.2d 1045 (1950) ; cf. Allegheny County, Pa. v. Maryland Cas. Co.
32 F.Supp. 297 (D.Pa. 1940). But cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (D.Cal. 1943).
27. See Crowley v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo. 489, 499, 223 P.2d 1045
1054 (1950).
28. See note 4 supra.
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also seem to permit a defendant in such an action, who files a coun-
terclaim, to join the plaintiff's liability insurer. 29 The amendment
apparently would permit the determination in one lawsuit of the
rights of all the parties, which arise form the ordinary automobile
accident. The principal objections to adoption of this amendment
appear to be: (1) that it would cause prejudice to the insurer, and
(2) that it would deprive the insurer of a substantive contractual
right.
Disclosure of the Insurer as Prejudical
The effect of joining the insurer in the original action is neces-
sarily to reveal to the jury the fact that the defendant is protected
by liability insurance. Courts have zealously guarded against such
disclosure, principally by adoption of an exclusionary rule of evi-
dence,30 on the theory that such information will influence the jury
in its determination of liability or its assessment of damages. 8' The
assumption is generally accepted by both attorneys and courts that
if the jurors learn that insurance is involved in the case they are
more likely to return a verdict for the plaintiff, or to return one for
a larger amount.3 2 On principle, if knowledge of insurance results in
such prejudice - althqugh the assumption is not subject to verifica-
tion, and appears to be a matter of pure conjecture - it would
seem that whenever information of insurance coverage is conveyed
to the jury a new trial should be granted. However, as a practical
matter, the jury is often informed of insurance coverage in a legiti-
29. Ibid.
30. See McCormick, Evidence § 168 (1954) ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 282a (3d ed. 1940). The exclusionary rule is uniformly followed. In Jessup
v. Davis, 115 Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190 (1926), the Nebraska Supreme Court
refused to follow the rule but reversed itself in Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc.,
130 Neb. 576, 265 N.W. 726 (1936). The court was commended for the latter
decision in Beghtol, The Present Rule as to Disclosure of Insurance in Per-
sonal Injury Cases, 15 Neb. L. Bull. 327 (1937) ; Note, 15 Neb. L. Bull. 185(1936).
31. See, e.g., Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 552-54, 18 N.W.2d
582, 588-89 (1945) ; Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 633, 233 N.W. 572,
575 (1930).
32. See Pierson, The Defense Attorney and Basic Defense Tactics § 140
(1956). Adherence to this assumption has approached absurdity in some cases.
See Texas Co. v. Betterton, 126 Tex. 359, 88 S.W.2d 1039 (1936), where the
plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the Texas Company, one of the
largest oil companies in the world. The court reversed because it was brought
to the attention of the jury that the Texas Company carried liability insur-
ance!
33. Although the University of Chicago jury studies are far from com-
plete, some investigation is being done in this area. Some of the interview
material suggests that the effect of insurance knowledge may be to cause thejury to give what it considers at an adequate award, and the absence of in-
surance requires them to give what they consider to be a less than adequate
award. Letter from Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., Director of the Jury Study
Project, January 8, 1957.
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mate manner due to exceptions to the rule. Thus, an inadvertant
reference to insurance is generally not ground for mistrial or re-
versal. 34 And, in the fact of insurance tends to prove some material
issue, the evidence will not be excluded, regardless of its "prejudical"
effect. For example, evidence of insurance may be admitted to show
ownership or control of an automobile, 35 the existence of an agency
relationship,3 6 or to impeach the credibility of a witness." A state-
ment which tends to show liability will not be excluded merely be-
cause it contains a reference to the defendant's insurance coverage.38
Moreover, plaintiff's counsel will probably convey the existence of
insurance coverage to the jury on voir dire examination of prospec-
tive jurors. In order to exercise the right to challenge for bias, coun-
sel may usually inquire of the jurors as to their interest in an insur-
ance company,3 9 although this right has been limited somewhat in a
few jurisdictions.40
Furthermore, it is common knowledge that an insurer is usually
involved in the defense of a lawsuit concerning an automobile acci-
dent which is on its face merely a contest between two individuals.
In view of the general prevalence of insurance coverage of automo-
biles today, and the existence of financial responsibility statutes, 4"
it is very likely that the jury will a-ssinn, 42 rightly or wrongly,43
that the defendant is insured. Nevertheless, some courts have refused
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. Enfield, 244 Minn. 474, 70 N.W.2d 409 (1955);
Shork v. Higgins, 157 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. City Ct. 1956).
35. E.g., Bash v. Hade, 245 Iowa 332, 62 N.V.2d 180 (1954) ; Martin v.
Schiska, 183 Minn. 256,236 N.W. 312 (1931).
36. E.g., Luquire Ins. Co. v. McCalla, 244 Ala. 479, 13 So.2d 865 (1943);
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal.2d 594, 110 P.2d 1044 (1941) ; Barg
v. Bousfield, 65 Minn. 355, 68 N.W. 45 (1896).
37. E.g., Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, 24 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1928);
Scholte v. Brabec, 177 Minn. 13, 224 N.W. 259 (1929); See, McCornmck,
Evidence 356 (1954).
38. E.g., Garee v. McDonell, 116 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 561 (1941); North v. Vinton, 17 Cal. App2d 214, 61 P. 2d 950
(1936).
39. See Seitz v. Claybourne, 181 Minn. 4, 231 N.W. 714 (1930) ; Belli,
Modem Trials § 118 (1954); Pierson, The Defense Attorney and Basic
Defense Tactics § 141 (1956).
40. See Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 IIl. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947) ; Note,
17 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 309-12 (1933).
41. See, e.g., Ariz. Code Ann. § 66-248 (1939) ; Minn. Stat. § 17021-
170.58 (1953). Generally stated, these laws require a driver who has been
involved in an accident in which personal injury or property damage above a
certain minimum was inflicted to prove that he is financially responsible for
future accidents either by bond or by procuring liability insurance. See Grad,
Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 Coluni. L.
Rev. 300, 307 n24 (1950). In 1956 all but three states had some form of
financial responsibility legislation.
42. See note 33 supra. A substantial number of jurors interrogated in
the Chicago jury studies believed, on the basis of their general experience, that
insurance was involved in the case.
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to permit joinder because of the possibility of prejudice due to open
disclosure of the insurer's interest. 44
Concealment of the insurer to protect against possible prejudice
seems a highly questionable reason to deny joinder, since it is likely
that in a particular case the jury will either assume insurance cover-
age, or its existence will be disclosed during the course of the trial.
Furthermore, knowledge of insurance coverage need not necessarily
result in excessive or unwarranted verdicts. There is no evidence
that verdicts are unusually high in states where statutes permit
direct action. On the contrary, Wisconsin, which permits joinder
of the insurer in automobile accident cases, is generally thought to
be a "low-verdict" state.4 5 Moreover, a distinguished defense attor-
ney has stated that in his experience (in a state which permits joinder
in certain cases) there apparently is no connection between the pres-
ence of the insurer as a party defendant and excessive verdicts."
If the insurer were formally joined as a party defendant the trial
court could frankly disclose to the jurors that insurance is involved
in the case; explain to them the theory of the indemnity policy ;47
and instruct them that in considering the liability of the defendant.
and in assessing damages, they are not to be influenced by the fact
that an insurance company may pay any judgment against the tort-
feasor. The court could explain that it has discretion to interfere
with any verdict which clearly appears to be excessive and to have
been the result of prejudice.48 There is no sound basis for belief that
43. If the assumption is wrong, that is, if the defendant is not protected
by liability insurance, the exclusionary rule seems to work a hardship on the
defendant. It is generally held that it is improper for the defendant to show
that he does not have insurance, or that he is only partially covered. See, e.g.,
Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940) ; Brown v. Murphy Trans-
fer & Storage Co., 190 Minn. 81, 88, 251 N.W. 5, 8 (1933) ; but see, Vick v.
MoeP74 S.D. 144, 49 N.W. 2d 463 (1951), where the court refused to reverse
when plaintiff raised an inference of insurance and the trial court permitted
defendant to rebut this inference.
44. See Jennings v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D. Mass. 1940) ; Hertz v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., 3 Fed. R. Serv. 18b15, case 3 (D.D.C. 1939) ; cf.
Buchholz v. Michigan Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 407 (E.D.Mich.
1956), (impleader denied to avoid prejudice) ; Remch v. Grabow. 70 N.Y.S.
2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (separate trials ordered to avoid jury prejudice).
45. See Belli, The More Adequate Award 3 (1952).
46. See Pierson, op. cit. supra, note 32 at 325.
47. Id. at 327; Nilles, The Right to Interrogate Jurors With Reference
To Insurance In Negligence Cases, 3 Dak. L. Rev. 406, 409 (1931). These
commentators suggest that jurors do not understand the difference between n
"indemnity" and a casualty or accident insurance policy.
48. See Berg v. Ullevig, 244 Minn. 390, 396, 70 N.W. 2d 133, 137-38(1955) ; Litman v. Walso, 211 Minn. 398, 402-03, 1 N.W.2d 391, 393 (1941).
It appears doubtful that the Minnesota Supreme Court would refuse to adopt
the proposed amendment on grounds of possible prejudice alone. Recent
decisions have indicated a distrust of the prejudice argument. See Sander v.
Dieseth, 230 Minn. 125. 126-27. 40 N.W.2d 844, 845 (1950) Odegard v.
Connolly, 211 Minn. 342. 345-46. 1 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1941).
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the jury would be influenced to a greater extent by information re-
ceived under these circumstances than by information which the
defendant attempts to conceal from them, and the plaintiff endeavors
to get across to them in a devious manner.
The "No-Action' Clause
Another argument which may be advanced against amending the
Rules to permit the plaintiff to join the defendant's liability insurer
is that such a result may not be accomplished by adoption of a pro-
cedural rule. The enabling legislation4 9 which granted to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court the power to regulate pleading, practice and
procedure, expressly states that the rules promulgated "shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant."30
This argument assumes that the no-action clause gives to the insurer
a substantive right - immunity from suit until the insured's liabil-
ity has been determined by judgment - which may not be abridged
by rules of court.
What is a "substantive" as opposed to a "procedural" right is
far from clear, and it is considered to be impossible to make a dear-
cut distinction for all purposes. 51 For rule-making purposes, it would
seem that procedure is best defined as the "method by which rights
and duties are to be protected and enforced .... "5- Although the
no-action clause appears to affect merely the method by which the
rights of the injured party, and the liabilities of the insured and the
insurer are to be determined, courts have taken the position that the
clause is a "substantive" contractual right of the insurer. In cases
where the plaintiff has attempted to join the insurer under the Rules,
this position has gained general acceptance, 3 although apparently
without extensive analysis. In applying direct action statutes,", this
question has also received some attention. Some courts consider the
no-action clause to be substantive in nature; others assert that it in-
volves merely procedural considerations. 55
49. Minn. Stat Ann. § 480.051 (Supp. 1956).
50. Ibid.
51. See Vanderbilt, op. cit. supra, note 17 at 94-97; Curd, Substance and
Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W.Va.L.Q. 34, 51 (1948) ; Joiner and Miller,
Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich.
L. Rev. 623 (1957).
52. Green, To What Extent May Courts Under The Rule-Making
Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence? 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 483-84 (1940).
53. See Headrick v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 205 (E.D.
Tenn. 1950) ; Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F.Supp. 146 (D.Mich. 1940) ; Crowley
v. Hardman Bros. 122 Colo. 489, 223 P.2d 1045 (1950) ; cf. Allegheny County
Pa. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 32 F.Supp. 297 (D.Pa. 1940).
54. See note 13 supra.
55. Compare Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F.Supp. 343,
354-55 (D.La. 1951) ; Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 256 Wis. 507, 514-16 (1950),
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As a practical matter, it could be argued that the no-action
clause affects only the method by which the injured party may assert
his claim; that is, it postpones the time of suit and the time of pay-
ment, and provides for payment to the insured alone, unless the
latter is unable to satisfy the judgment. The substantive liability
of the insurer could not be affected in any way by permitting joinder,
since if no judgment is secured against the insured, no liability would
result to the insurer. It might also be argued that joinder would force
the insurer into needless litigation, but this contention has little
force inasmuch as the insurer usually is involved in the defense of
the suit against the insured anyway, or if it refuses to defend may,
in most jurisdictions, be impleaded by the insured.5
The procedure by which the injured claimant seeks to recover
for his injuries should be regulated by the courts, not dictated by
private contractual agreements. Clearly the court could find that
the no-action clause serves no useful or substantive purpose, in
that it merely determines the method by which rights and liabilities
are to be decided. The result of its application is to slow up the
judicial processes by requiring two suits where litigation could
easily be disposed of in one suit without prejudice"7 or inconveni-
ence to any of the parties. "[I]ts object is to put weights on the
already too slow feet of justice." '58
The result which the proposed amendment seeks to achieve
appears to be in accord with the philosophy behind procedural re-
form. It has been stated that one of the primary objectives of the
Rules of Civil Procedure is to avoid multiplicity of suits and circuity
of action, by settling as many matters as possible in one lawsuit,
"except where this may make the suit too many-sided and compli-
cated for the jury to unravel, or where this free joinder may cause
prejudice to some party or claim." '
with Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512, 514 (La.App. 1936). The Minnesota
Supreme Court would apparently characterize the no-action clause as sub-
stantive in nature. In Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 492 (1947), the
court characterized the Wisconsin direct action statute as procedural for
conflict of laws purposes, and refused to apply it in this state so as not to
divest the insurer of his rights under the no-action clause.
56. See DeParcq and Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under
Modern Pleading Rules, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 229 (1954).
57. But see Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66,
75-76 (1954) (concurring opinion), where Justice Frankfurter argues that the
clause protects the insurer from jury prejudice. The same argument is set forth
in Comment, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 366, 367 (1951).
58. Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F.R.D. 140, 142 (W.D.Mo. 1945).
59. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 581 (1952).
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Adoption of this amendment would permit independent actions
involving the same parties and the same subject matter to be tried
and determined in one lawsuit. Perhaps as a practical matter two
suits are usually not required, 60 but joinder would facilitate the
determination of the insurer's liability and the insured's rights under
the policy. It could spare the insured and the injured claimant unnec-
essary delay and expense in seeking recovery when there is a ques-
tion of the insurer's liability under the policy terms.0' The financial
protection afforded by the liability policy would be made directly
available to the person by whom the loss is actually sustained with-
out requiring unnecessary subsequent procedures. If simultaneous
litigation of the plaintiff's claim and the insurer's defenses under
the policy should unduly complicate the trial proceedings, the court
could order separate trials under Rule 42.02
Adoption of this proposed amendment would restore integrity to
the trial courts, where an insurer is involved, by apprising the jury
of the identity and interest of the insurer, who under the policy terms
may have exclusive control of the defense of the suit, may supply
counsel for the defendant, and may reserve to itself the right to
settle or carry on the litigation. 3 The exclusionary rule, which has
resulted in a great deal of unneeded litigation,0 ' would be supplanted
with frank and open discussion of the insurer's status in the litiga-
tion.
60. The number of instances where the injured party or the insured are
forced into subsequent litigation to collect on the judgment does not appear
to be great. If the insurer chooses to defend the insured, he may be estopped
to deny liability. See Nikkari v. Jackson, 226 Minn. 393 33 NL.W.2d 36 (1948);
Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138 N.W. 281 (19125. If the insurer refuses
to defend, he might be impleaded by the insured. DeParcq and Wright, note
56 supra. See Coleman, The Defendant Insurance Company in Automobile
Cases, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1934) (where it is "guessed" that only in 1 per
cent of the cases is a second suit required).
61. See, e.g., Bettinger v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 213 F2d 200
(8th Cir. 1954) (two lawsuits and three years required to determine in-
sured's and insurer's liabilities) ; Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grasso, 186 F2d
987 (2d Cir. 1951) (three lawsuits and six years) ; Shelby Nut. Cas. Co. v.
Richmond, 185 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1950) (two lawsuits and five years).
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) ; Minn. R. Civ. P. 42.02. See Note, 39 Minn.
L. Rev. 743, 745-50 (1955).
63. Professor McCormick contends that the litigant is entitled to know
the identity of his opponent, the court is entitled to know the parties that are
using its officers and facilities, and the jury is entitled to know the identity of
all the real parties in interest, which the insurer is all but name. McCormick,
Evidence 358 (1954).
64. Some of the cases are collected in six extensive annotations. See
Annot, 4 A.L.R.2d 764 (1949); 105 A.L.R. 1319 (1936); 95 A.L.R. 388
(1935) ; 74 A.L.R. 849 (1931) ; 56 A.L.R. 1418 (1928) ; 28 A.L.R. 516 (1924).
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DISCOVERY OF THE DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE
The proper status of the defendant's liability insurer in negli-
gence litigation has caused confusion and disagreement in another
area since the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure.10 It has
been widely debated whether or not the discovery rulesOT provide
for inquiry by the injured claimant into the existence and extent of
the defendant's liability insurance coverage."' If the liability insurer
were considered to be a real party in interest to the litigation, few
would argue that the plaintiff should not be permitted to discover
the existence of the defendant's insurance coverage under these
Rules. However, the liability insurance policy traditionally has been
considered to be merely a private contract between the insured and
the insurer, and the fact that the defendant is insured has generally
been thought to be "irrelevant" to the substantive issues of liability
and damages. 9
In cases where the defendant's insurance coverage was technic-
ally relevant to a substantive issue in the case, discovery of insur-
ance has been allowed." But there is sharp disagreement as to
whether or not the discovery rules may be used to elicit this infor-
mation solely for the purpose of evaluating the case for trial or
settlement.7 1
65. Although the discussion is here concerned primarily with discovery
of the defendant's insurance coverage, the principles involved apply equally
well to the plaintiff's liability insurer when the defendant files a counter-
claim. The proposal for amendment reads: "that the rules be amended to give
the claimant in a negligence action an absolute right to discover the insurance
coverage and policy limits." 13 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 6, p. 42 (1956).
66. See note 2, supra.
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37; Minn. R. Civ. P. 26-37. For a discussion of
the scope and function of discovery see Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial
Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633 (1952) ; Holtzoff, Instr i-
mnents of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich. L. Rev.
205 (1942) ; Notes, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 364 (1952), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 712 (1947).
68. Compare Note, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 322 (1953), with Wright, Minnesota
Rules 162-65 (1954).
69. See note 15 supra.
70. See Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956) (admission of fact
and history of vessel) ; McDowell Associates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 23
Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.31, case I (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (ownership of machinery) ;
Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (operation and control of
automobile) ; Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539
(1933) (ownership of automobile); Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768,
59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (control of premises) ; cf. Tobe Deut-
schmann Corp. v. United Aircraft Products, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (questions which seek to elicit information as to financial condition per-
mitted when representation was made that financial condition was sound).
71. For cases permitting discovery, see Kingdom of the Netherlands v.
Ferrary Marine Repairs, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Brackett v.
Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) ; Maddox v.
Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. App. 1954) ; Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951). For cases holding discovery is not
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THE DiscovERY RULE IN MINNESOTA
The district courts in Minnesota had been in disagreement over
this question prior to 1955 when the supreme court decided in
Jeppesen v. Swanson72 that discovery of insurance before judgment
is obtained in an action on the merits is not within the purview of
the discovery rules. In the district court, the plaintiff had obtained an
order pursuant to Rule 3473 for production of defendant's insurance
policy. The affidavit in support of the motion stated only that plain-
tiff's attorneys could not properly evaluate a figure for settlement
or trial without knowledge of the extent of insurance coverage. On
application for a writ of prohibition to restrain enforcement of the
order, the supreme court held that where the information sought
is for the sole purpose of evaluating a cause of action, it is not
discoverable.74 Reasoning that the purpose of discovery is to
ascertain facts which may be used for proof or defense of an action,
the court concluded that it is not intended to be utilized to supply
information for the personal use of the litigants that "has no con-
nection with the determination of the issues involved in the action
on their merits." 75 The court suggested that if discovery of insur-
ance coverage is desirable, and it expressed doubts about that,
then it could better be accomplished by an amendment than by a
strained interpretation of the rules."
THE PRoPosED AMENDMENT
After the Jeppeson decision, a bill was introduced in the Minne-
sota Legislature to avoid its results but was dropped apparently
because of a recommendation that the legislature should not interfere
with the rule-making power of the court.7 7 The proposed amend-
ment, to give the claimant in a negligence action the right to dis-
cover the existence and extent of insurance coverage as a matter
of course, was suggested in its place.
Relevancy
Perhaps the principal objection to permitting discovery of insur-
ance coverage is that it is not considered "relevant to the subject
allowable, see McNelly v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tean. 1955); Mc-
Clure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952) ; Jeppesen v. Swranson,
243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); State v. Second Judicial District
Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952).
72. 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955) ; 40 Minn. L. Rev. 183 (1956).
73. Minn. R. Civ. P. 34.
74. 243 Mlnn- at 562-63, 68 N.W.2d at 658.
75. Id. at 560, 68 N.W.2d at 657.
76. Id. at 562, 68 N.W.2d at 658.
77. See Wright, Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending
the Federal Rules, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 839, 861 n.82 (1956).
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matter of the pending action" as required by Rule 26.18 Some
courts have taken the position that information is subject to dis-
covery only when it is technically relevant to the issues which are to
be litigated or when it will lead to admissible evidence."' According-
ly, it is reasoned that information about insurance coverage is not
discoverable since it would not be relevant for use at trial, or for
use as a lead to information which might be used at trial, but
relates solely to the collectibility of a judgment.8 0
Certainly, if discovery is to be confined to inquiries which are
technically relevant to the substantive issues, information about
insurance coverage should not be susceptible to discovery proce-
dures. Some courts have taken the position, however, that the
"subject matter" of a lawsuit includes not only the questions of
liability and extent of damages, but also the chances of recovery."
Thus, for purposes of discovery, "relevancy" should perhaps be
construed broadly, as applying to the entire scope of an action,
from its origin to collection of the judgment. Discovery of insur-
ance has been allowed under this theory, as information which is
relevant to preparation of the case for trial, or arriving at a disposi-
tion other than trial.82
In a very broad and realistic sense, the collectibility of a prospec-
tive judgment is relevant to the subject matter of a pending action,
as "few litigations are undertaken solely to vindicate legal principles
or philosophy. .". ."83 Although the existence of insurance traditional-
ly is not considered to be relevant to the issues which arise at a trial
on the merits, and theoretically is of no legal interest to the injured
party until after his claim has been successfully prosecuted, it
seems unrealistic and hyper-technical to consider it irrelevant to
the subject matter of a pending action.
It has also been suggested that permitting discovery of insur-
ance would increase the danger of this irrelevant and "prejudicial"
information getting to the jury.84 There seems to be little merit
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02.
79. See, e.g., Stewart Stamping Corp. v. Westchester Products Co., 17
F.R.D. 248, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; General Motors Corp. v. California Re-
search Corp., 8 F.R.D. 568, 570 (D. Del. 1948).
80. See McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; Jeppesen
v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 554, 68 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1955).
81. See Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Ferrary Marine Repairs, Inc.,
14 F.R.D. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939, (Ky.
1954).
82. See Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.
Tenn. 1951).
83. Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Ferrary Marine Repair, Inc., 14
F.R.D. 14, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
84. See Note, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 322, 331 (1953) ; 9 Okla. L. Rev. 412,
413 (1956).
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in this contention-even if the assumption of prejudice to the insurer
were valid-since information may be obtained by discovery even
though it is not admissible at the trial., 5 "The determinative pre-
trial inquiry . . . is not whether a possibility of trial prejudice
[exists] .... 1
Invasion of Privacy
In support of their refusal to permit discovery of the insurance
policy, some courts have drawn an analogy to requiring disclosure
of private information such as the defendant's financial worth,
-the property he owns, or his bank accounts.s7 It is asserted that
courts should not permit the invasion of an individual's private
financial affairs until a judgment has been obtained against him
which remains unsatisfied.
Undoubtedly it is undesirable to permit the discovery procedures
to be used as an excuse to conduct an unwarranted excursion into
a defendant's private affairs, but it has been observed that the
analogy is without practical significance.18 The proposed amend-
ment explicitly restricts the subject matter of discovery to liability
insurance, which is unlike other general assets in that it is of no
value to the insured until he incurs liability to third persons. When
such an injured person inquires into the existence of insurance
coverage, which is available only for a judgment secured against the
insured, the inquiry does not have the objectionable connotations of
one directed at purely private assets.
Enactment of safety responsibility legislation s" adds weight to
this contention. The apparent objective of such statutes is to re-
quire that individuals who drive motor vehicles be financially
capable of satisfying claims for damages suffered in accidents. 0
Thus, the state has declared its policy that once an individual has
become involved in an accident, his financial responsibility is no
longer of purely private interest. Moreover, the general solvency
of a defendant may usually be ascertained without difficulty by
85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) ; Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02; see Tobe Deutsch-
mann Corp. v. United Aircraft Products, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953).
86. Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1956).
87. See McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1952);
Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 560-61, 68 N.W.2d 649, 657 (1955).
88. See Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, 12 F.R1D. 4, 5 (E.D.
Tenn. 1951) ; Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 563, 68 N.W.2d 649, 659(1955) (dissenting opinion).
89. See note 41 mpra.




resort to private credit agencies, or garnishment proceedings,"
but there does not appear to be any satisfactory way that the exist-
ence or extent of insurance coverage may be ascertained without
resort to discovery procedures.
Bargaining Position
It has been suggested that the true purpose of requesting dis-
covery of insurance coverage is to give to the plaintiff a more
advantageous position to force settlement than he enjoys without
knowledge of the insurance limits.2 It is claimed that if such
information were required to be disclosed, plaintiff's attorneys would
place a value on their cases based not upon the extent of damages,
but on the ability of the defendant or his insurer to pay."
There does not seem to be much doubt but that the plaintiff
would be put in a better bargaining position by disclosure of the
policy limits. His demands would most likely be tempered by the
expediency of settlement when the policy limits are small in com-
parison with the claim. If, for example,94 the plaintiff had a claim
he valued at $20,000, he would probably reject an offer of settle-
ment for $9,000 if he knew the policy limits were $15,000. The
$9,000 offer would probably appear more satisfactory to him, how-
ever, if he knew that the policy limits were only $10,000. On the
other hand, he might press a larger claim if he knew the policy
limits were high, and thought the insurer could be "badgered" into
settlement." However, since insurance companies handle a great
number of such claims, and litigate frequently, it is reasonable to
assume that they will not tolerate such tactics.
In any event, disclosure of the insurance limits would put the
settlement discussion on a more realistic basis. Although the ability
of a defendant to pay a judgment should not be a consideration in
evaluation of a claim, it is certainly of paramount importance in
determining the advisability of litigation. Unnecessary litigation
could be avoided by frank and thorough discussion on a basis of
mutual knowledge of all the facts. Both parties should have access
to this information so that settlements may be achieved on a fair
basis. It has been observed that disclosure of insurance may be a
91. See Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 563, 68 N.W.2d 649, 659(1955) (dissenting opinion).
92. See Young, Discovery by Plaintiff of Defendant's Liability Insurance
Coverage, 1956 Ins. L. J. 503, 507.
93. Id. at 504, 508.
94. The example is based on the assumption that the tortfeasor does not
have other sufficient liquid assets to settle a claim.
95. See Young, supra note 92, at 504.
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bargaining advantage to either or both parties, depending upon the
size of the claim in relation to the size of the policy.0
There does not appear to be any serious possibility that the in-
sured or the insurer would be prejudiced by discovery other than
being deprived of the advantageous bargaining power they enjoy in
possessing knowledge not within the reach of the plaintiff. Cer-
tainly one of the objectives which the Rules seek to attain is that
of inducing pre-trial settlements whenever feasible. The discovery
rules were intended to be construed liberally, with a view toward
securing the "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."97 Permitting the plaintiff to discover the existence and
extent of insurance coverage should help to realize that purpose
more fully.
96. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 755, 235
P.2d 833, 836 (1951) ; Belli, Modern Trials § 18 (1954) ; Pierson, The De-
fense Attorney and Basic Defense Tactics 252 (1956).
97. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Mmin. R. Civ. P. 1.
